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ABSTRACT 	
This study hypothesizes that prosecutors would be more likely to prosecute juveniles who 
engage in sexual activity with an underage same-sex partner than those who engage in 
underage sexual activity with a member of the opposite sex. To test this hypothesis, 
surveys were mailed to 1,000 prosecutors around the United States with a between 
subject design, meaning that each participant was only exposed to one condition in the 
vignette they read. There were a total of four vignettes, creating four conditions of 
different “offender” sex and “victim” sex in sexually appropriate relationships. The 
vignettes contain conditions in which either a male or female junior in high school was 
videotaped having oral sex with either a male or a female freshman in high school.  
Prosecutors were asked questions about whether they would prosecute the older student 
for statutory rape.  Results indicated that manipulations of “offender” sex and “victim” 
sex were not statistically significant on prosecutorial discretion or punishment 
severity/motives; however, these manipulations did alter the prosecutors’ perceptions of 
the offender. 
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According to the noted, late Yale historian John Boswell (1993), most historians 
agree that “no Western legal or moral tradition—civil or ecclesiastical, European, 
English, or Anglo-American—has ever attempted to penalize or stigmatize a 
‘homosexual person’ apart from the commission of external acts” (p. 40).  In contrast to 
sexual identity, however, sexual activity between members of the same sex—especially 
acts of oral or anal sex, have been proscribed in Western civilizations by either civil or 
ecclesiastical laws for centuries, often subsumed under the general term “sodomy” 
(Brooks, 1985; Fradella, 2002).  
Sodomy was made a crime against the state at common law in the sixteenth 
century by Henry VIII…. By the Victorian Era, the mass suppression of 
sexuality of all types led to the criminalization of all acts of sodomy, whether 
homosexual or heterosexual. The Puritans brought the sodomy laws with them 
to the colonies.  As the country grew, sodomy laws spread as a part of 
common law and were in effect in all 50 states.  Up until the mid-1960s, these 
sodomy laws facially applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, 
although the targets of prosecution were usually homosexuals …, and judicial 
construction of the apparently gender-neutral statutes was often targeted at 
homosexuals.  For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the majority 
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court “described the Georgia law solely as a 
prohibition on ‘homosexual sodomy’ despite the fact that the statute was 
gender-neutral and applied to all sodomy.” (Fradella, 2002, p. 280, quoting 
Leslie, 2000, p. 112). 
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About half of U.S. state laws criminalizing oral sex and anal sex between 
consenting adults were repealed or declared unconstitutional between the late 1960s and 
the early 2000s (Fradella, 2002), the remaining laws criminalizing such sex acts were 
ultimately invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas 
(2003).  Although the decriminalization of sexual activity between member of the same-
sex helped to usher in greater social acceptance of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people1 
(Pew Research Center, 2013), there can be no doubt that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual identity remains one of the last legalized prejudices in the United States.  For 
example, nearly 15 years after the decision in Lawrence, it remains legal in more than 
half the states to discriminate against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in employment, 
housing, and places of public accommodation (Movement Advancement Project, 2017).  
And in just the past two years, hundreds of bills have introduced in legislatures across the 
United States “aimed at granting a broad range of religious exemptions to individuals, 
																																																								
1  Lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are often referred to as part of the collective acronym, 
“LGBT,” which stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender.   
 
 In recent years, the acronym has grown longer to include the letters Q, I, and 
either one or two As.  The Q stands for queer (although it can also mean 
questioning); the I stands for intersex; and at least one A stands for asexual.  
When a second A is used, it refers to allies who do not identify as LGBTQIA, but 
who support the rights and safety of those who do identify as one of the letters in 
“the great alphabet soup of queer identify” (Englert & Dinkins, 2016, p. 7, 
quoting Tobia, 2013, para 1.).   
 
 This thesis primarily concerns sexual activity, rather than sexual orientation. 
Although lesbian, gay, and bisexual people might engage in same-sex acts, other 
people who do not identify as being lesbian, gay, and bisexual might also engage in 
same-sex sexual activity.  Thus, I make a distinction between same-sex sexual 
behavior and sexual identity (see Ward, 2015) and avoid using the catch-all acronym 
that conflates these distinct concepts. Moreover, because this thesis does not test any 
condition in which a transgender person engaged in any sexual activity, the LGBT 
acronym would be misleadingly over-inclusive to describe the present study. 
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companies, and public and private institutions from non-discrimination laws that are 
already on the books” (Bellis, 2016, para. 5). 
Fradella, Burke, and Owen (2009) explained that the legal backlash to Lawrence 
v. Texas was not limited to the civil law realm.  Prejudice against sexual minorities often 
manifests in violence against people perceived to be gay, lesbian, bisexual, or 
transgender.  Indeed, for several years running, the FBI (2016) has reported that LGBT 
people are more likely to be targets of hate crimes than any other minority group in the 
United States (see also Park & Mykhyalyshyn, 2016). Yet, “[p]olice are only rarely 
trained” to deal with LGBT issues; indeed, some law enforcement officer are so 
homophobic that they harass sexual minorities (Fradella, Burke, & Owen, 2009, p. 131). 
Research suggests that sexual minorities may also be victimized by court actors: 
One public defender in Philadelphia (Smith, 2002), witnessed prosecutors 
“routinely reduce charges in serious cases—often encouraged by judges—
whenever a gay complainant had prior arrests for solicitation” (p. 102). She 
also observed that GLBT people are “Notoriously badly treated throughout the 
criminal justice system: police are nasty to them; marshals, court officers and 
other court personnel often mock them; it is the rare judge or magistrate who 
treats these defendants with dignity or respect.” (Fradella et al., 2009, p. 132, 
quoting Smith, 2002, pp. 103–104). 
And although “Lady Justice” wears a blindfold, it is clear that justice is not blind. 
Disparate impact on the basis of race, ethnicity, and sex in the criminal justice system—if 
not outright discrimination—is well-documented (see Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2018). 
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Although significantly less well-studied than race, ethnicity, and sex, the same is true for 
sexual orientation.  
For instance, gay or lesbian defendants have received more harsh penalties 
than heterosexual defendants for acts such as statutory rape (State v. Limon, 
2005) and solicitation (Louisiana v. Baxley, 1995).  Conversely, gay and 
lesbian victims may have to contend with the gay panic defense (Chen, 2000), 
for which there is no heterosexual analogue. (Fradella et al., 2009, p. 132), 
Some of these observations, however, were made nearly a decade ago.  This thesis 
explores whether such biases persist in ways that might manifest in the criminal courts of 
the United States. 
Literature Review 	
Explicit prejudice, specifically racial prejudice, in the United States declined 
significantly in the decades following the Second World War.  Researchers who have 
studied this decline empirically posit that race-based prejudice became socially 
unacceptable and, in turn, caused others to condemn those who expressed such biases 
(Campbell, 1947; Dowden, Robinson, 1993; Firebaugh, Davis, 1988; Rokeach & Ball-
Rokeach, 1989). This assertion aligns with modern theories of prejudice which maintain 
that individuals are generally aware of the fact they would come across in socially 
undesirable ways if they were to express their biases openly, so they limit their explicit 
expressions to avoid condemnation from others yet continue to exhibit more subtle 
implicit biases (Crandall, Eshleman, O’Brien, 2002). Accordingly, decreases in 
expressions of racism might be a function of social suppression of such views, rather than 
actual reductions in racial prejudice. The increased levels of racist speech and hate-crime 
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incident following the election of Donald Trump emphasize this important distinction 
(see, e.g., DeVaga, 2017; Reilly, 2016). This effect in racially prejudice has been 
witnessed in acceptance rates of sexual orientation, to an extent, in recent decades 
(Crandall, Eshleman, O’Brien, 2002; Gallop, 2015).    
Social acceptance of diverse sexual orientations has grown significantly in the 
past 20 years (Crandall, Eshleman, O’Brien, 2002; Gallop, 2015).  Yet, as with those who 
continue to espouse racist views, there are still significant segments of contemporary U.S. 
society who express vitriolically anti-gay sentiments.  But in ways that arguably differ 
from vocal race-based prejudices, those who condemn lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and 
transgender people (LGBT) are well represented in politics (Stone, 2016)—so much so 
that more than 100 anti-LGBT bills were introduced in state legislatures during 2016 
(Bendery & Signorile, 2016; see also Steinmetz, 2016). 
Discrimination Against Homosexual People  	
Homosexual people have been condemned for acting upon their sexual attractions 
for hundreds of years, largely as a function of the belief that engaging in non-procreative 
sex was a sin (Bullough & Bullough, 1977; Fradella & Sumner, 2016). The idea that 
homosexuality is immoral penetrated many different cultures throughout the world, and 
was eventually codified in many legal systems (see Brooks, 1985; Fradella, 2002; 
Johnson & Vanderbeck, 2014). For most of U.S. history, participation in homosexual sex 
acts constituted a criminal offense that went by a variety of monikers, including 
“sodomy,” “buggery,” “deviant sexual intercourse,” and “the abominable and detestable 
crime against nature” (Barnhart, 1981, p. 254; see also Fradella, 2002; Fradella & 
Grundy, 2016; Salerno, et al., 2014).  
	 6	
Recall that Lawrence v. Texas (2003) decriminalized private acts of sodomy 
between consulting adults.  Lawrence, in turn, formed part of the key precedent for 
recognizing a federal constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry in the United 
States (see United States v. Windsor, 2013; Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015).  Yet, the stigma 
against homosexual people is still very much present in our country (see Fradella & 
Sumner, 2016; Herek, 2009; Saewyc et al., 2006).  Consider that although Gallop (2015) 
reports that 63% of respondents in a nationwide poll express views that gay and lesbian 
relations are morally acceptable, that still leaves more than one in three people 
disagreeing with that premise. Moreover, disapproval of such relations appears to vary by 
sex.  According to a Pew Research Center survey (2013),  
One-in-four LGBT adults say there is a lot of social acceptance of lesbians, 
while only 15% say there is a lot of acceptance of gay men. Similarly there is 
a gap in views about social acceptance of bisexual women and men. One-third 
of all LGBT adults say there is a lot of social acceptance for bisexual women; 
only 8% say the same about bisexual men. (Ch. 2, paras. 7–8).  
The stigma resulting from social views that condemn homosexuality often 
manifests in ways that are discriminatory.  For example, sexual orientation is an 
extralegal factor that can affect how police, prosecutors, juries, and judges act in criminal 
cases, although it should have no bearing on these processes (Fradella & Sumner, 2016; 
see also Brunelli, 2000; for concrete examples, see Sterling v. Minersville, 2000; Kansas 
v. Limon, 2005). Furthermore,  
While selective prosecution based on gender plagues this area of the law, this 
is not the only type of bias causing problems for age of consent laws. Biased 
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functioning and application of age of consent laws in regards to sexual 
preference also cast doubt on the legitimacy of these laws. The penalties for 
same-sex violations of age of consent laws may be much harsher and 
prosecutors are more likely to bring charges even when there is no coercion 
and the parties are very close in age. (James, 2010, p. 253) 
Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at criminal justice officials’ perceptions of 
homosexuality as a variable in criminal justice offending and processes, taking into 
account that sex might influence discretionary decision-making in this realm (Brunelli, 
2000; James, 2010).  
Brunelli (2000) explains, “consider a situation in which a homosexual has been 
accused of rape or sexual assault on a person of the same sex and then uses a defense of 
consent. This might be used against him or her in a prosecution for homosexual sodomy, 
even if he or she is acquitted of the rape or sexual assault charges” (p. 3; see also 
Fradella, 2002). Although Lawrence v. Texas (2003) generally invalidated the broad 
scope of most sodomy laws in the United States, the Supreme Court was careful to limit 
the scope of its decision to acts of oral or anal sex that occur in private between 
consenting adults (Fradella & Grundy, 2016).  Thus, non-consensual acts of sodomy 
remain illegal and are often prosecuted as rapes (Fradella & Grundy, 2016).  Moreover, 
voluntary acts or oral or anal sex may also be criminally prosecuted if they occur in 
public or if an underage minor is a participant (Fradella & Grundy, 2016; James, 2010).  
 Although prosecutions for non-forcible sodomy or statutory rape are rare when 
post-pubescent teenagers engage in oral or anal sex, it remains an open question whether 
moral outrage by prosecutors plays a role in whether such acts are criminally prosecuted 
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(James, 2010). Brunelli (2002) surveyed jurors after a trial involving an openly 
homosexual defendant. Although only eight out of the 80 jurors questioned responded 
that they were bias against homosexuals, more could have easily kept their bias to 
themselves (Brunelli, 2000). This study adds to the body of knowledge evidencing that 
discrimination against homosexuals can infiltrate the courtroom.   
Additional research further suggests that such discrimination may also affect how 
someone is criminally sanctioned.  For example, Salerno, Bottoms, and Murphy (2014) 
had 212 participants read a brief description of sex offender registration laws (to provide 
general context) and then one of several vignettes depicting the case of a male offender 
(of either 16 or 35 years of age) who videotaped a 14-year-old performing oral sex on the 
offender. Participants were then asked to indicate whether the person should have to 
register on a publically-accessible registry of sex offenders; register as sex offender, but 
not in a manner that was publicly accessible; or not have register as a sex offender at all 
(Salerno et al., 2014). They found that, “although the legal system requires that laws be 
applied equally, ambiguity surrounding punishment, decisions for juveniles in consensual 
peer sex resulted in more severe punishment of gay, compared to heterosexual 
youth…when the context was normatively unambiguous (i.e. adult-juvenile sex) 
discrimination against gay offenders did not manifest” (Salerno, et al., 2014, p. 402). In 
addition to the case outcome, study participants were also asked about their impression of 
the individual being charged. The researchers reported that “punishment decisions for 
juveniles engaged in consensual peer sex resulted in more severe punishment of gay, 
compared to heterosexual, youth”  (Salerno et al., 2014, p. 5). These findings, along with 
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the decision of Kansas state courts in a high-profile, post-Lawrence sodomy case, 
inspired the current study.  
Kansas v. Limon 	
Kansas, like many states, sets the age of consent for sexual activity at 16; thus, 
sex with a minor under the age of sixteen constitutes the crime of statutory rape (KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505).2 Such statutory rape laws can be used to punish normal teenage 
sexual experimentation if one partner is over the age of consent and the other is under the 
age of consent, even though both are close in age.  To prevent that from occurring, at 
least 45 states have enacted so-called “Romeo and Juliet” laws (James, 2009). These age-
gap provisions often exempt teenagers within a certain number of years (typically fewer 
than four) of each other’s ages from being criminal prosecuted for sexual activity3 with 
each other (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1047(F); N.J. REV. STAT. 2C:14-2). Alternatively, 
they provide for significantly mitigated criminal sanction, reducing what would be high-
level felony to a lower-level offense. Kansas opted for this latter approach, setting the 
maximum penalty for sexual activity between teenagers close in age to 15 months 
incarceration, rather than 17 years (see, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522).  But the Kansas 
age-gap provision specified that it applies only to sex acts between members of the 
opposite sex.  Put differently, the Kansas law was purposefully written to apply to 
“Romeo and Juliet,” but not “Romeo and Romeo” or “Juliet and Juliet” (see Higdon, 
																																																								
2  Age of consent laws can differ from state to state, however, the standard age of 
consent typically falls between 16 and 18. Until then, minors cannot legally consent 
to sexual acts.   
3  Some states Romeo and Juliet laws are limited to penile-vaginal penetrative sex, 
while other states include a broader range of sex acts (e.g., manual stimulation, oral 
sex, anal sex).  
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2008), thereby illustrating the continued stigma and discrimination gays and lesbians 
face, even under the law.  And this caused quite a problem for Matthew Limon. 
At the relevant time, Limon was a football player in his senior year of high 
school. Shortly after his eighteenth birthday, he engaged in a non-coercive act of oral sex 
with a 14-year-old-boy who was also a student at the same high school (ACLU, 2005; 
Limon v. Kansas, 2005). Limon’s attorneys argued that limiting the “Romeo and Juliet” 
exception to opposite-sex encounters violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The lower courts of Kansas rejected this 
argument and, as a result, Limon was sentenced to more than 17 years in prison (ACLU, 
2005; Kansas v. Limon, 2005), rather than the 15 months maximum sentence that could 
be imposed if Limon had engaged in oral sex with a female (ACLU, 2005). Of course, 
there is reason to believe that had the sexual encounter occurred between a member of the 
opposite sex, charges might not have been pressed at all because heterosexual teenage 
sexual activity is considered more normative (ACLU, 2005).  The Kansas intermediate 
court of appeals affirmed Limon’s conviction (State v. Limon, 2014). Limon served three 
years in prison before the Kansas Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that the 
state’s Romeo and Juliet provision could not be limited to acts between opposite-sex 
partners without violating equal protection.   
However, in situations where this bias can be camouflaged, such as in the 
punishment portion of the prosecutorial process in cases where moral outrage runs high, 
this bias can manifest and become apparent (Crandall, Eshleman, O’Brien, 2002). During 
sentencing, prosecutors have an excuse to punish and this justification factor makes it 
easier to express these prejudices.  
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Prosecutorial Discretion 	
The Limon case illustrates several important realities related to sex offense in 
contemporary U.S. culture.  First, and most generally, although statutory rape is 
qualitatively different from sexual assault, it is nonetheless a sex crime.  As a result, those 
who commit the offense—even those like Matthew Limon who are close in age to their 
voluntarily participating “victim”—can be subjected to harsh punishments aimed at broad 
yet ambiguous class of criminals. These “criminals” are lumped into the category of sex 
offenders—a class of offenders that have been singled out for particularly harsh sanctions 
since seven-year-old Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted and killed in 1994 by a 
previously-convicted sex offender who lived down the street from the Kanka family 
(Terry, 2006). Media coverage of the case (and some other high-profile cases) fueled a 
public outcry for tougher sentences for sex offenders, the creation of state-sponsored 
registries to track sex offenders after their release from prison, community notification 
programs, and even restrictions on where offenders may live (Galeste, Fradella, & Vogel, 
2012; Terry, 2006). Demographic, conviction, and residence information are often 
included within the registry for anyone with access to a computer to see (Connor & 
Tewksbury, 2017; Terry, 2006).  
Sex offender punishments typically involve long periods of incarceration, 
followed by involuntary institutionalization or sex offender registration.  These sanctions 
do not emphasize rehabilitation; they generally serve retributive and incapacitative ends 
(Garfinkle, 2003; Letourneau et al, 2010). Indeed, sex offender sanctions frequently 
represent a “just desserts” mentality because sexual offenses are viewed as particularly 
despicable, eliciting strong punishment motivations (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; 
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Salerno, Bottoms, & Murphy, 2014). These motivations can be heightened when 
extralegal factors, like prejudices, produce high levels of moral outrage, which can 
produce higher certainty in a guilty verdict, thus making these cases particularly sensitive 
and in need of study (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013).  
Second, the Limon case illustrates the fact that prosecutors hold a substantial 
amount of discretionary power in the criminal justice system (Frase, 2000; Reiss, 1974).  
Indeed, they “exercise virtually unfettered discretion relating to initiating, conducting, 
and terminating prosecutions” (Neubauer & Fradella, 2016, p. 162)—so much so that 
their decision-making is largely unreviewable, even when largely viewed as 
unnecessarily harsh or unfair, as many perceived it to be in the Limon case.  Prosecutors 
also wield significant influence on the punishments doled out to criminal defendants after 
conviction through punishment recommendations (Albonetti, 1987; Free, 2002; Neubauer 
& Fradella, 2016; Simon, 2007).  Although this discretion is instrumental to the operation 
of the criminal justice system, this discretion also leaves the door open for extralegal 
factors to impact decision-making (Spohn, Beichner, & Davis-Frenzel, 2001; Spohn, 
Spears, 1996). This bias can be sparked by anything from the demeanor of the defendant 
to strong political ideologies and may even be subconscious, which makes this bias 
difficult to realize and extract from the decision-making process (Spohn, Beichner, & 
Davis-Frenzel, 2001). Ideally, the courtroom workgroup functions as a system of checks 
and balances system in these circumstances (Simon, 2007; Walker, 2015).  However, 
bias, especially implicit bias that is much more difficult to detect than overt animus, can 
sometimes clog the components of legal machine, preventing it from working the way it 
should (Spohn, Beichner, & Davis-Frenzel, 2001; Simon, 2007; Walker, 2015). Put 
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differently, extralegal factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, age, and sexual orientation, 
may influence prosecutorial decision-making, even unintentionally (Amirault & 
Beauregard, 2014; Shermer & Johnson, 2010). 
Third, the Limon case, like many criminal cases involving sex crimes, seemed to 
have evoked strong levels of moral outrage.  But two high-school students engaging in 
voluntary sexual activity with each other would not normally evoke such emotional 
tensions that would cause a prosecutor to press charges and seek the maximum sentence 
allowable under law.  Such actions beg the question, “Why?” Perhaps the moral outrage 
attendant to the case was caused, in part, by the fact that Limon was a senior in high 
school and the other student was a first-year student who was four years younger than 
Limon.  But since the Kansas statute lessens the punishment for a defendant age 19 or 
younger who engaged in sexual activity with someone between the ages of 14 and 16, the 
age difference, per se, does not appear to be the cause of moral approbation.  Rather, the 
fact that the oral sex occurred between two teenage boys appears to have caused 
significant moral outrage.  This conclusion is supported by the brief filed on behalf of the 
state of Kansas when defending against Limon’s equal protection challenge to its Romeo 
and Juliet law in which the state’s attorney cautioned that granting equal protection to 
same-sex acts would open to the door to “combinations as three party marriages, 
incestuous marriages, child brides, and other less-than-desirable couplings” (as cited in 
Pflaum, 2004, para. 64). Importantly, social psychological research supports the notion 
that strong moral condemnation may be linked to exercising discretionary decision-
making (such as prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing decisions) based on the 
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extra-legal factors causing the moral disapproval (see Saltzstein, 1994; Stuart & Abt, 
1979). 
Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) studied how a combination of anger and disgust 
can predict moral outrage. From their research, they found that “anger toward moral 
transgressions (sexual assault, funeral picketing) predicted moral outrage only when it co-
occurred with at least moderate disgust, and disgust predicted moral outrage only when it 
co-occurred with at least moderate anger” (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013, p. 2074). In 
their study, 102 participants—recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk4—were 
given a vignette about “David” who either sexually assaulted someone or picketed a 
funeral (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). Participants were then administered a battery of 
psychological measures geared to determine the level of disgust and, or anger they felt 
(Salerno & Hagene, 2013). Within this evaluation were four questions to measure their 
moral outrage, such as “On a scale of 1-5, I feel morally outraged by the defendant” 
(Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013, p. 2070).  The study concluded that anger was a 
predictor of moral outrage when it co-occurred with disgust, and vice versa. (Salerno & 
Peter-Hagene, 2013). When using a murder case vignette, the study demonstrated that a 
“combination of anger and disgust might increase moral outrage, which in turn might 
increase participants’ confidence in a guilty verdict” (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013, p. 
2074). By specifically testing emotionally disturbing cases (e.g. sexual assault and 
funeral picketing), this study demonstrated that people are swayed by their emotions in 
cases that illicit high amounts of anger and disgust, equating to moral outrage (Salerno & 
																																																								
4  Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is a paid service with many features. As it relates to this 
study, the Sentiment App was used to determine the opinions of Amazon users in a 
randomized sample. 
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Peter-Hagene, 2013). These results strongly suggest that prosecutorial discretion might be 
influenced by prosecutors’ moral outrage in sexual assault cases. Certain extralegal 
factors, such as sex and implied sexual orientation, may illicit similar moral outrage in 
cases of sexual assault.  
In a 2010 study, prosecutors, among others, were surveyed in order to determine 
differences in punishment for juveniles and adults in sex offender cases (Salerno, 
Stevenson, Wiley, Najdowski, Bottoms, & Doran, 2010).  The researchers concluded that 
prosecutors almost equally favor assigning the punishment of online sex offender 
registration and more traditional sex offender registrations that are not available online 
regardless of age.  This indicates that age does not have enough of a mitigating effect to 
counteract perceptions of offenders in sexual offense cases regarding the appropriateness 
of sex offender registration—a particularly damaging and shameful punishment— as a 
criminal sanction (Salerno et al., 2010; Cook, 2010).  Although this survey did not 
include specific case information, the results are enlightening on the attitudes of 
prosecutors, and the general public, towards different ages of sex offenders and the 
severity of punishment personally justified. 
Fear as Punishment Motive 
 
The most common framework for understanding the interplay between legally-
relevant (e.g., offense type, prior record, etc.) and legally-irrelevant (e.g., race, sex, age, 
sexual orientation) case characteristics is the focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier, 
Kramer, & Ulmer, 1995; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). This theory posits that 
charging decisions by prosecutors and sentencing decisions by judges are constrained by 
time, resources, and limited information about the defendant.  So, these decisions are 
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often made on the basis of certain social stereotypes as part of a ‘perceptual shorthand’ 
that connects these stereotypes to key offender characteristics, based on three focal 
concerns: “the blameworthiness and culpability of the offender; a desire to protect the 
community; and concerns about practical constraints and consequences” (Hartley, 2014, 
p. 1). Because these focal concerns rely heavily on extralegal factors, discretion decisions 
can be heavily influenced by both conscious prejudice and implicit bias (see, e.g., Kang 
et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, as stated by Shermer and Johnson (2010), “Prosecutors, like other 
organizational actors, are faced with uncertainty that may lead them to develop decision-
making schema that incorporate past practices and reflect the subtle influences of social 
and cultural stereotypes in society. These stereotypes emerge through an attribution 
process that links these “perceptual short-hands” in ways that promote efficient case 
processing, but at the expense of allowing conscious and unconscious biases to influence 
discretionary devisionmaking vis-à-vis the stereotypes attached to various extralegal 
factors (Hawkins, 1981; Kang et al., 2012). Furthermore, the schemas that prosecutors 
may develop—within the context of crime—can produce decisions that are principally 
driven by fear and stereotypes. Extralegal characteristics—such as race, sex, or sexual 
orientation, illicit stereotypes that are usually negative—with the exception of women 
who, across the board, are treated more leniently in the criminal justice system (Brennan, 
2006). Indeed,  
In many American communities, particularly those angered by publicized 
instances of violent crime, some prosecutors have responded directly to the 
potent fear of crime and passion for punishment they can arouse. In these 
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communities, the reciprocity underlying the old courtroom “work team” is 
replaced with a new model in which the prosecutor is clearly a dominant 
force. (Frisbie & Garrett, 1998, p. 41)  
Sexual activity between same-sex partners were criminalized for so long that 
many people came to view LGBT people as criminals who are sexually promiscuous or 
even sexually aggressive predators (Barnhart, 1981; Fradella, 2002; Fradella & Sumner, 
2016). These beliefs may motivate some people to view LGBT people as a particularly 
dangerous class of sex offenders who deserve severe punishments (see, e.g., Bryant, 
1977).  Indeed, “antigay activists have routinely asserted that gay people are child 
molesters” (Herek, 2013, para. 3).  Although the percentage of the general public in the 
United States who equate homosexuality and child molestation has declined substantially 
(see Herek, 2013), this false belief persists.  Consider, for example, that the Catholic 
Church continues to insinuate this dubious link as a justification for preventing gay men 
from becoming priests (see O’Loughlin, 2016).  And such beliefs may have motivated the 
Kansas officials who prosecuted Matthew Limon to seek harsh punishment in spite of the 
fact that Limon’s “victim” consistently maintained that the oral sex between the two 
teens was “consensual” (Pflaum, 2004, para. 4).5 
Adult Time for Adult Crime 
 
At the time Matthew Limon engaged in oral sex with this “victim,” he was 18 
years of age—an adult in the eyes of the law.  But the harsh sentence he received until his 																																																								
5  Technically, the 14-year-old boy with whom Matthew Limon engaged in oral sex was 
too young to grant lawful consent. But he nonetheless expressed to authorities that he 
was a willing participant who voluntarily engaged in the sex act without any coercion 
from Limon (see Pflaum, 2004). 
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conviction was overturned on appeal is not unique for young sex offenders.  Consider the 
case of Georgia teenager Genarlow Wilson.  When he was 17 years of age, Wilson 
engaged in multiple sex acts with two girls, ages 15 and 17 (Tuck, 2013). The younger 
girl could not grant effective legal consent to sex because she was under the age of 16 
[GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-3(a)]. Wilson was acquitted of rape, but convicted of aggravated 
child molestation for having oral sex with a minor.  He was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison—the required minimum mandatory sentence for that offense (Tuck, 2013).  Yet, 
had he been convicted of engaging in vaginal sexual intercourse with the 15-year-old, the 
state’s Romeo and Juliet law would have reduced his crime to a misdemeanor punishable 
by a maximum period of incarceration of 12 months [GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-3(c)].6 
After Wilson served nearly 2.5 years in prison, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned 
his conviction, calling it “grossly disproportionate to his crime” and, therefore, 
unconstitutional, “cruel and unusual punishment” (State v. Wilson, 2007, p. 532).  
The practice of sentencing juveniles to the same punishment as an adult sanction 
may be shocking to some, but it is practiced under a variety of circumstances (Salerno, 
Stevenson, Najdowski, Wiley, Bottoms, & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Wood, 2012). The 
juvenile court system exists, at least in principle, because our society recognizes that 
children differ from adults when it comes to their ability to think though the 
consequences of their actions and that criminal misconduct should be handled separately 																																																								
6  Georgia’s age-gap provision at that time did not include protections for acts of oral or 
anal sex, just like in Kansas at the time of Matthew Limon’s prosecution. These laws 
illustrate the continued vestiges of legalized discrimination against LGBT people 
through their effective removal of the protections of age gap mitigating provisions for 
LGBT youth. It took Wilson’s case—one involving heterosexual activity—to prompt 
the Georgia state legislature to revise their Romeo and Juliet provision to apply to sex 
acts other than penile-vaginal sexual intercourse [Ga. L. 2006, pp. 379, 413, § 30 (a)]. 	
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(see Neubauer & Fradella, 2016).   Indeed, the juvenile justice system is designed to 
rehabilitate youth—steering them away from criminal deviance by providing youth with 
the appropriate resources and support (Champion, Merlo, & Benekos, 2013). Yet, many 
critics argue that the juvenile justice system is broken and does not accomplish this 
original intention (see Dowd, 2015; Wood, 2012; Garfinkle, 2003).  It has become so 
harsh—so punitive—that it only serves to facilitate a school-to-prison pipeline, rather 
than accomplish goals of rehabilitation (Dowd, 2015). Furthermore,  
Legislative changes have also given prosecutors a larger role in choosing the 
fate of juvenile offenders…Today, virtually all states allow prosecutors to 
place juveniles who are charged with serious or violent crimes in adult court, 
and states require them to do so for a range of violent crimes. The prosecutor 
now acts as a gatekeeper determining access to the juvenile process itself. 
Indeed, this gatekeeping function, once given largely to judges in the criminal 
justice system, now ends with the prosecutors. (Simon, 2007, p. 40) 
This punitiveness is further exemplified by the way that juvenile sex offenders are 
treated.  Not only are they often waived into adult court, but also are subjected to the 
same types of sanctions applied to adult offenders including being forced to register as a 
sex offender (Garfinkle, 2003; see Barbaree & Marshall, 2008). Punishments under 
Megan’s Law shows a lack of consideration to the unique characteristics that separate 
juvenile criminal offenders from adult criminal offenders, such as low recidivism rates 
and a superior disposition to rehabilitative services than adult offenders (Terry, 2006; 
Cook 2006).  
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Many critics argue that inclusion on a sex offender registry is far too harsh of a 
punishment for juvenile offenders (e.g., Cook, 2006; Garfinkle, 2003). Sex offenders 
need to register with state authorities so their names, ages, addresses, crimes, and even 
photos can be entered into a publically-searchable database (Letourneau, 
Bandyopadhyay, Armstrong, & Sinha, 2010; Garfinkle, 2003). Depending on the level of 
threat that the offender is as deemed by the state, authorities may require these 
individuals notify neighbors in the surrounding area of their status, offense, and physical 
address (Letourneau et al., 2010; Garfinkle, 2003).  In addition, some offenders are 
required to comply with residency laws that restrict the areas in which they can live 
(Letourneau et al., 2010; Garfinkle, 2003).  And some sex offenders must report to a 
probation or parole officer for the rest of their lives (Letourneau et al, 2010; Garfinkle, 
2003). These restrictions represent only a portion of the legal aspect of sanctions imposed 
on sex offenders (usually after a period of incarceration), but there are social 
consequences as well.  For example, sex offenders may be ostracized from society; some 
may even become victims of vigilantism or community prosecution for their crimes 
(Salerno, et al., 2013; Simon, 2007).  These types of sanctions can significantly limit—if 
not outright impede— offender reintegration into society (Salerno, et al., 2013; Cook 
2006). These effects are exacerbated when the full range of sanctions are imposed on 
juveniles; indeed, these sanctions reduce juveniles’ chances of becoming functional 
citizens of society because of the labeling effect (Cook, 2006).  
Placing juveniles on sex offender registries has not been shown to deter 
recidivism (Letourneau, Bandyopadhyay, Sinha, & Armstronget, 2010; Terry, 2006; 
Garfinkle, 2003). A study spanning 15 years determined that there has been an increase in 
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guilty verdicts in sex offender cases overall, resulting in a corresponding increase in 
number of people subjected to the collateral consequences of sex crime conviction 
(Letourneau, et al., 2009). This can be attributed to the fact that fewer sex offender cases 
are being brought to trial, as the study deduced, and that the few that do proceed up are 
because they bear a considerable amount of evidence, thus making a conviction more 
promising. In this study, the courtroom workgroup7 was shown to reach a consensus that 
the policy of sex offender punishment is serious, and therefore, only try the most serious 
of cases where they believe that the defendant deserves to meet this punishment 
(Letourneau, et al., 2010). Whether the deservedness of each individual is dependent on 
solely legal factors or if extralegal factors influence the prosecutorial decision process 
enough to make an impact has yet to be determined, although some high-profile cases, 
such as the ones discussed in the previous section, suggest the law is not as even-handed 
as it is supposed to be. But research has not adequately studied how juvenile offenders 
are treated, especially in cases where “normal” teenage sexuality, rather than deviant 
sexual aggression, might explain the underlying conduct (Murrie, 2012). Thus, it is 
important to study in order to determine if extralegal factors do have an effect on 
prosecutorial discretion in nonviolent sex crime cases, especially in a special population 
such as juveniles.  
  
																																																								
7  The courtroom workgroup is a common term referring to the informal processes and 
agreements that a prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge make regarding laws, cases, 
and punishments (Eisenstein, Jacob, 1991). 	
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Methods 
Hypotheses 	
Based on the research summarized in the literature review (Letourneau et al., 
2009, 2010; Salerno & Hagene, 2013; Salerno et al., 2014; Spohn et al., 2001), I 
hypothesize as follows: 
1. Prosecutors will be more likely to prosecute same-sex8 offenders than opposite-
sex individuals. 
2. Prosecutors are more likely to prosecute males than females. 
3. Prosecutors are more likely to prosecute male same-sex offenders than any other 
sex manipulation combination.  
4. Prosecutors will be more likely to punish same-sex offenders more severely than 
opposite-sex offenders. 
5. Prosecutors are more likely to punish males more harshly than females. 
6. Prosecutors are more likely to severely punish male same-sex offenders than any 
other sex manipulation combination 
In addition to these hypotheses concerning “offender” sex, “victim” sex, 
implication from differing sex combinations, I also seek to answer a research question for 
which no hypothesis is appropriate, given the exploratory nature of the question.  
Specifically, I examine whether any effects seen in prosecutorial discretion and 
punishment motives can be explained through the prosecutor’s interpretation of law. For 
example, Romeo and Juliet statutes may not specify that they apply to same-sex couples, 																																																								8		 This paper will use “same-sex offender” and “opposite-sex offender” terminology 
versus homosexual offender and heterosexual offender in order to not assume sexual 
orientation identification. In certain instances “implied sexual orientation” will be 
substituted for clarity. In addition, “sex” will replace “gender” so as to also not 
assume gender self-identification.		
	 23	
thereby opening the potential for prosecuting and punishing someone accused of sexual 
activity with an underage person of the same-sex.   
Pilot Study  	
I conducted a pilot study in which an electronic survey was emailed to 750 
prosecutors across the United States. But very few prosecutors completed the survey. 
Indeed, because the sample was so small (n=20, 2%), running statistical analysis was not 
viable (Caraveo Parra, 2016). But the low response rate to email-based surveys caused 
me to reevaluate my sampling strategy for the study that forms the basis of this thesis. 
Variables
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Table 1. Variables 	
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Decision to 
Prosecute 
Decision to Prosecute refers to whether or not 
the prosecutor elected to prosecute the case 
provided in the vignette (Survey Question 1). 
Length of Time 
on Sex 
Offender 
Registry 
Length of Time on Sex Offender Registry refers 
to the amount of time that the prosecutor 
recommends the offender be on the sex offender 
registry (Survey Question 9). 
Attributions Attributions refers to the attitudes of prosecutors 
towards the offender (Survey Question 11a-11k). 
Independent 
Variables 
Sex of 
“offender” 
Sex of “offender” refers to the sex of the 
offender, either male or female, in order to see 
how sex impacted prosecutor’s decision making.  
Sex of “victim” Sex of “victim” refers to the sex of the victim, 
either male or female, in order to see how sex 
impacted prosecutor’s decision making. 
Control 
Variables  
Likely Win Likely Win refers to the prosecutor’s perceived 
likelihood of winning the case (Survey Question 
4). 
Confidence Confidence refers to the level of confidence that 
the prosecutor has in his/her decision on the most 
appropriate outcome for the vignette offender 
(Survey Question 8). 
Recidivism Recidivism refers to the prosecutor’s perception 
that the vignette offender will commit another 
sex offense through an incremental scale (Survey 
Question 10). 
Discretion Discretion refers to the absence or presence of 
discretion in prosecuting this case on an ordinal 
scale of 1-5 (Survey Question 11k). 
Presence of 
Romeo & Juliet 
Statutes 
Presence of Romeo & Juliet Statutes refers to 
whether the prosecutor, to the best of his/her 
knowledge, knows of a Romeo and Juliet or 
similar exemption on the books in their state 
(Survey Question 24). 
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The dependent variables in this study are Decision to Prosecute, Length of Time 
on Sex Offender Registry, and Attribution. Decision to Prosecute refers to whether or not 
the prosecutor elected to prosecute the case provided in the vignette and is measured 
through the simple yes or no response in Question 1. Length of Time on Sex Offender 
Registry refers to the amount of time that the prosecutor recommends the offender be on 
the sex offender registry and is measured through an open response question in Question 
9). Attributions refers to the attitudes of prosecutors towards the offender asked in 
question 11 and its sub questions such as, “David poses a danger to society” and “I feel a 
compelling need to punish David.” 
The independent variables in the study are Sex of “Offender” and Sex of 
“Victim.” Sex of “offender” refers to the sex of the offender, either male or female, in 
order to see how sex impacted prosecutor’s decision making. Sex of “victim” refers to the 
sex of the victim between male and female in order to see how sex impacted prosecutor’s 
decision making. These variables are measured through the survey code at the bottom of 
the survey, indicating what the sexes of the victim and offender in the vignette. 
Manipulating the sex of the “offender” and the “victim”, these signify extralegal factors 
that are aspects of the case that beyond the scope of the law.  Because justice is blind and 
judicial treatment of all individuals should be equal in terms of due process, these aspects 
should not be considered.  
Control variables that will be included in the analysis that may be highly 
correlated with the dependent variable of Decision to Prosecute include: Likely Win, 
Confidence, Recidivism, Discretion, and Presence of Romeo & Juliet Statutes9. Likely 																																																								9		 Romeo	&	Juliet	statutes	are	intended	to	protect	juveniles	engaging	in	sexual	activities	if	there	is	a	short	age	gap	between	the	above	age	individual	and	below	age	individual.	Specifics	on	what	
	 26	
Win refers to the prosecutor’s perceived likelihood of winning the case and is measured 
though an incremental percentage scale in Question 4. Confidence refers to the level of 
confidence that the prosecutor has in his/her decision on the most appropriate outcome 
for the vignette offender (Question 8). Recidivism refers to the prosecutor’s perception 
that the vignette offender will commit another sex offense through an incremental 
percentage scale of in Question 10. Discretion refers to the absence or presence of 
discretion in prosecuting a case, based on the prosecutor’s perception, and measured 
through an ordinal scale of 1-5 in Question 11k. Presence of Romeo & Juliet Statutes 
refers to whether the prosecutor, to the best of his/her knowledge, knows of a Romeo and 
Juliet statute—or similar exemption on the books in their state. This variable is measured 
through a yes or no question, followed by a question asking the statute code in Question 
24. These control variables were added into the data analysis in order to obtain better 
estimates within the regression analysis. Control variables that reveal to not be correlated 
with our dependent variables do not affect the figures and, or effects reported. 
Attributions Scale 	
Question 11 in our survey (see Appendix A) tested for the participant’s moral 
attributions toward the fictional defendant in the case.  The question, which consisted of a 
series of 11 Likert-scale questions regarding the participant’s perception of the offender, 
sought to measure the prosecutor completing the survey felt about the offender (see 
Appendix A).  The questions were used because they had been previously validated as a 
measure of offender attributions related to sexually-based offending (Salerno, Bottoms, 
Murphy, 2014). Questions included measures of whether respondents believed the 																																																																																																																																																																					these	sexual	activities	are	and	the	width	of	the	age	gap	differs	between	states.		
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offender is “a perverted person” or “a danger to society.” These questions provide us with 
a more complex and developed determination of the prosecutor’s attitude towards the 
“offender” in the vignette that may not get weeded out in previous questions regarding 
legal decisions. Furthermore, the attributions were measured through Likert scale 
responses to learn to what extent the prosecutor was influenced by the extralegal factors 
presented in the vignette. These questions, when combined with “offender” sex and 
“victim” sex manipulations, provide us with the results that answer our previously stated 
hypotheses.  From these responses, an inter-item correlation matrix was created in order 
to scale these responses and eventually create one measure to relate back to our 
manipulations.  	
Sampling Frame 	
For this study, I surveyed 982 prosecutors from all 50 states in order to ensure a 
representative sample from which generalizations might be made. Google searches were 
conducted individually by state using phrases such as “Arizona state prosecutors” or 
“Arizona state district attorneys” within each state provided the mailing information 
needed to mail these surveys. Prosecutors were selected out of those who had their 
mailing addresses online. Only direct office-mailing addresses or P.O. boxes were 
included in the sampling frame.  
Table 2. Prosecutor Sample Demographics 
Prosecutor Nationwide Demographics (Women Donors Network, 2015) 
 Male (83%) Female (17%) 
White: 79% 16% 
Other: 4% 1% 
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The Women Donors Network provided the above statistics in 2015, which filled a 
gap in knowledge of current demographic statistics throughout the U.S. on specifically 
prosecutors. Other organizations that also collect data into this population, such as the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the American Bar Association, but they do not collect 
demographic data or do not disaggregate data between sex, race/ethnicity, or by type of 
law practitioner (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). As of 2007, the BJS found there are 
just over 2,300 prosecutors in the nation and more recent research from the Women 
Donors Network indicates that there are over 2,400 prosecutors (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2007; Women Donors Network, 2015). In general, the average age of all 
practitioners in law is 49 and I have found no data regarding political inclinations, 
however, the assumption can be made that prosecutors will lean more towards the 
conservative side of the political spectrum due to the known demographic data (Pew 
Research Center, 2015).  
Data Collection 	
I expected a much higher response rate than our pilot study due to the increased 
data collection methods implemented so that our results can be generalizable to 
prosecutors in the United States. To accomplish this, I utilized mail paper surveys, rather 
than email online surveys to prosecutors, primarily because staff at most district 
attorneys’ offices do not open attachments or links from unknown or unsolicited email 
addresses, a lesson I learned this the pilot study that yielded mere 2% response rate. 
When compared to emailed and faxed surveys, physical surveys sent via the mail 
generally yield better response rates, especially when other “best practices” are also 
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followed, such as a letter from the university stating the legitimacy of the survey, 
monetary reimbursement for participation, or the color of the paper the survey is printed 
out on (McMahon et al., 2003; Raziano et al. 2001; King & Vaughan, 2004). With the 
exception of monetary reimbursement for participation, all of these suggestions for 
increasing the response rate were incorporated into the present research design. 
Survey 	
There were four different versions of the survey, all having the same questions but 
with four different vignettes to set up the differing scenarios of oral sex between differing 
sexes of offender and victim. The survey is a between subject design, meaning that each 
participant was only exposed to one condition in the vignette they read. The vignettes are 
as follows:  
Vignette 1.  David, a high school junior, attended a party at a friend's house. 
During the party, a freshman boy performed oral sex on David. The boy’s parents found 
out about the incident and decided that they wanted to press criminal charges. Although 
both teenagers stated that the act was consensual, because the boy was underage, he could 
not legally provide consent. This incident occurred in a state that has a "Romeo and 
Juliet" exemption for contact between minors who are similar in age that would lead to a 
misdemeanor charge in this case if the act had been sexual intercourse, but the exemption 
does not mention oral sex. 
Vignette 2. David, a high school junior, attended a party at a friend's house. 
During the party, a freshman girl performed oral sex on David. The girl’s parents found 
out about the incident and decided that they wanted to press criminal charges. Although 
both teenagers stated that the act was consensual, because the girl was underage, she 
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could not legally provide consent. This incident occurred in a state that has a "Romeo and 
Juliet" exemption for contact between minors who are similar in age that would lead to a 
misdemeanor charge in this case if the act had been sexual intercourse, but the exemption 
does not mention oral sex. 
Vignette 3. Jen, a high school junior, attended a party at a friend's house. During 
the party, a freshman boy performed oral sex on Jen. The boy’s parents found out about 
the incident and decided that they wanted to press criminal charges. Although both 
teenagers stated that the act was consensual, because the boy was underage, he could not 
legally provide consent. This incident occurred in a state that has a "Romeo and Juliet" 
exemption for contact between minors who are similar in age that would lead to a 
misdemeanor charge in this case if the act had been sexual intercourse, but the exemption 
does not mention oral sex. 
Vignette 4. Jen, a high school junior, attended a party at a friend's house. During 
the party, a freshman girl performed oral sex on Jen. The girl’s parents found out about 
the incident and decided that they wanted to press criminal charges. Although both 
teenagers stated that the act was consensual, because the girl was underage, she could not 
legally provide consent. This incident occurred in a state that has a "Romeo and Juliet" 
exemption for contact between minors who are similar in age that would lead to a 
misdemeanor charge in this case if the act had been sexual intercourse, but the exemption 
does not mention oral sex. 
Survey Format 	
 The survey was designed to be a double-sided, single-page survey (i.e., the front 
and back of one page) that incorporated by closed-ended question for quantitative 
	 31	
analyses and open-ended questions for qualitative analysis. In the pilot study, the survey 
was twice as long and reiterated the control measures within differently phrased questions 
to limit interpretation errors as well as to obtain a more accurate picture of the 
participant’s responses. Because it was crucial to the response rate to shorten the survey, 
and control questions could not be reconsidered, questions were not altered from the 
original survey in the pilot study to ensure survey reliability. Appendix A contains one 
version of the survey used for the reader’s reference.  
To maximize our potential response rate, the mailing consisted of a single page 
that contained survey questions on both the front and back (Fox, Crask, & Kim, 1988). 
This design was purposefully selected because research suggests that the more concise a 
survey is, the more likely attorneys will see completion as an appropriate use of their time  
(Fox et al., 1988). In addition, the mailing included a cover letter signed by my thesis 
committee stating the legitimacy of the study, which has shown to improve response rates 
(Snyder & Lapovsky, 1984). This statement will also appeal to each attorney’s pragmatic 
side to help advance our knowledge through this study. The mailing also contained a self-
addressed stamped envelope with first class postage in which to mail the survey back 
(Snyder & Lapovsky, 1984). By doing this, it reduced the time the participant spends on 
the mailing part, further incentivizing participation (Snyder & Lapovsky, 1984).  
Anonymity 	
The survey asks for no identifying characteristics, such as name, to protect the 
opinions and verdict of the prosecutors and reduce the risk of re-identification. Although 
return addresses from the return envelope were available, many states have multiple 
prosecutors’ mail going to one mailbox making determining ownership difficult. Because 
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this is sensitive and potentially damaging information, each survey was coded only to 
identify the state in which the respondent practiced. This procedure guarded against the 
possibility that a respondent failed to indicate their state—a critical variable for verifying 
the presence of a Romeo and Juliet statute in that prosecutor’s state.  
Validity 	
Internal validity is secured chiefly in the method in which the data was obtained, 
the survey. Containing over 30 questions and sub-questions, each data piece has the 
opportunity to threaten the internal validity of this study because of wording. However, 
there are two measures that were taken to reduce this threat. First, the questions were 
either directly taken or adapted from the study by Salerno, Bottoms, and Murphy (2014) 
that tested similar measures. By taking these from a previously published study, it 
ensured that they accurately and adequately measure the intended variables and can 
provide statistically significant results. Second, the full battery of questions was tested 
out in a pilot study. Since I did adapt several of the questions from the Salerno, Bottoms, 
and Murphy (2014) study, this pilot testing was necessary to establish the reliability of 
the edited questions, as well as participant comprehension of the modified phrasing. Our 
attitudinal scale was further compiled from questions previously used in our pilot study 
and the Salerno, Bottoms, and Murphy (2014) and was tested for reliability using 
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.69) which I found to be adequately reliable. Moreover, surveys 
distributed to our sample of prosecutors were randomized during the mailing process to 
further ensure internal validity. I attempted to ensure external validity through a 
nationwide sampling of prosecutors. Sampling prosecutors from every U.S. state 
increases the generalizability of the results.  
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Qualitative Methods 	
This survey had several short-response questions in which participants could 
expand upon their decisions about this case, as well as provide additional information 
they identified as important to the case. Because these results provided additional insight 
into the thought processes and consideration of our participating prosecutors, I decided 
that a qualitative analysis of these responses would add dimension and understanding into 
our results. In vivo10 and open coding strategies11 were used in our analysis. These 
responses were completely read through several times in order to get an idea of 
reoccurring trends and notable accounts (Altheide, 1996). During this process, key words 
or key phrases were weeded out from each response and the frequencies were recorded–
i.e. closeness in age, consent, juvenile court has a rehabilitative purpose (Altheide, 1996). 
In order to be classified within a category, responses had to be a complete or almost 
complete match and explicitly stated to meet our standard of qualification.12  
Results 
Quantitative Prosecution Discretion Patterns 	
 
A total of 982 surveys were sent out throughout the United States and 70 surveys 
were received for a return rate of 7%. Although this is a much higher sample size than in 
the pilot study, our overall return rate remained very low; however, this is not too 																																																								
10  In vivo coding is the method of assigning a label or code to a section of qualitative 
data by using a word or short phrase taken directly from the data  (Saldana, 2008) 
11  Open coding strategies, sometimes referred to as emergent coding, is method of 
gleaning out codes through themes and phrases repeated throughout a qualitative 
dataset (Berg, 2014)	12		 Qualification standards were determined prior to qualitative data coding to ensure that 
reliability within analysis and accurate interpretation of the data.		
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surprising considering the low return rates associated with mailed surveys (Fox, Crask, & 
Kim, 1988; McMahon et al 2003). At least 10 surveys were received in each category of 
vignette; although this is a small number, it met our threshold to continue with the data 
analysis (Opposite-Sex Female Offender=24, Same-Sex Female Offender=15, Opposite-
Sex Male=18, Same-Sex Male Offender=11). The limitation associated with sample size 
and return rate will be further explained in our limitations section. Surveys from 27 states 
were received to compile a sample that was 69% male, an average of 45 years old 
(SD=11), 97% white and 3% black, 54% politically conservative, 25% politically liberal, 
and 21% politically moderate. 
No significant effect was found from any of our manipulations—“offender” sex 
and “victim” sex—with respect to the decision to prosecute.  The cross tabulation of 
offender sex/victim sex and the decision to prosecute below depicts whether or not a 
participating prosecutor would choose to prosecute this case and the vignette offender’s 
sex layered with the vignette victim’s sex. This table represents the basic distribution, in 
percentage, of prosecutorial discretion amongst our manipulation of “offender” sex and 
“victim” sex. 
 	
Table 3. Cross Tabulation of Sex of “Offender”/ Sex of “Victim” & Decision to 
Prosecute: 	
Table 1: Cross Tabulation (Sex of “Offender”/ Sex of “Victim” & Decision to 
Prosecute) 
“Offende
r” Sex 
“Victim” 
Sex 
No, I would not 
choose to 
prosecute this 
case 
Yes, I would 
choose to 
prosecute this 
case 
Total  
Male Opposite 
Sex 
Offender 
15  
83.3% 
3 
16.7% 
18 
100% 
Same Sex 9 2 11 
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Offender 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
Total 24  
82.8% 
5 
17.2% 
29 
100% 
Female Opposite 
Sex 
Offender 
20 
83.3% 
4  
16.7% 
24 
100% 
Same Sex 
Offender 
11 
73.3% 
4 
26.7% 
15 
100% 
Total 31 
79.30% 
8  
20.5% 
39 
100% 
Total Opposite 
Sex 
Offender 
35 
83.30% 
7  
16.7% 
42 
100% 
Same Sex 
Offender 
20 
76.9% 
6 
23.10% 
26 
100% 
Total 55 
80.90% 
13 
19.1% 
68 
100% 
Opposite-Sex Offender: Number of Observed=10, df= 1, Chi2=0.00, Prob > 
Chi2=0.738 
Same-Sex Offender: Number of Observed=10, df= 1, Chi2=0.00, Prob > Chi2=0.738 
Total: Number of Observed=20, df= 1, Chi2=0.00, Prob > Chi2=0.672 
 
I also ran a logistic regression to control for the factors that might otherwise 
influence the decision to prosecute.  
Table 4. Logistic Regression of Sex of “Offender”/ Sex of “Victim” & Decision to 
Prosecute: 
Table 2: Logistic Regression (Sex of “offender”/ Sex of “victim” & Decision to 
Prosecute) 
Decision to 
Prosecute  (Yes 
Dummy) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
z P > | z | [95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Sex of “offender” 
(Male Dummy) 
4.54 4.97 1.38 0.17 0.53 38.80 
Sex of “victim” 
(Opposite Sex 
Dummy) 
1.82 1.56 0.69 0.49 0.34 9.82 
Likelihood of 
Winning 
1.00 0.001 1.71 0.09 1.00 1.01 
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Confidence in 
Decision 
1.00 0.001 1.14 0.26 1.00 1.01 
Perceived 
Likelihood of 
Recidivism 
1.00 0.001 0.45 0.65 1.00 1.00 
Presence of 
Discretion 
1.00 0.001 2.46 0.014 1.00 1.01 
Presence of 
Romeo & Juliet 
Statutes 
0.41 0.41 -1.14 0.25 0.09 1.88 
Sex of “Offender” 
X Sex of “Victim” 
(Interaction 
Effect) 
0.59 1.05 -0.30 0.77 0.02 19.32 
Constant 0.03 0.004 -2.49 0.01 0.002 0.48 
Number of Observed=70, LR Chi2(7)=17.37, Prob > Chi2=0.0265, Psuedo 
R2=0.2585 
 
The results from this analysis show that “offender” sex and “victim” sex have do not 
have a statistically significant effect on prosecutions decisions.  
After the logistic regression, I ran a marginal effects model in order to more 
uniformly determine the effect size that “offender” sex and “victim” sex dummy 
variables has on a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute the case.   
Table 5. Marginal Effects of Sex of “Offender”/ Sex of “Victim” & Decision to 
Prosecute: 
Table 3: Marginal Effects (Sex of “offender”/ Sex of “victim” & Decision to 
Prosecute) 
 dy/dx Delta-
Method 
Standard 
Error 
z P > | z | [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Sex of 
“offender” 
(Male 
Dummy) 
0.17 0.12 1.42 0.16 -0.07 0.41 
Sex of 
“victim” 
(Opposite Sex 
0.07 1.00 0.70 0.48 -0.12 0.26 
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Dummy) 
Number of Observed= 70 
 
The above results determine that being male increases the likelihood of being prosecuted 
17%, while being heterosexual increases the likelihood of being prosecuted by 6%, 
although these effects are not statistically significant.  
Figure 1. Prosecutor Attributions Sex of Offender and Victim: 
Offender Gender, F(1, 62) = 9.51, p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.13 
Offender Sexual Orientation, F(1, 62) = 2.77, p = 0.101, ηp2 = 0.04 
Offender Gender x Offender Sexual Orientation, F(1, 62) = 6.65, p = 0.012, ηp2= 0.10 
 
Although there was no effect from our manipulations in the decision to prosecute, 
there was an effect in how the prosecutor perceived the offender (Male Opposite-Sex: 
M=1.77 SD=0.57, Male Same-Sex: M=1.69 SD=0.71, Female Opposite-Sex: M=2.43 
SD=0.59, Female Same-Sex M=1.54 SD=0.51).  Figure 1 depicts how prosecutorial 
attributions of the offender interact with both offender sex and the whether the sex act 
involved someone of the same or opposite sex.  The figure illustrates that the sex of the 
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offender has a significant impact on the ways prosecutors judge those involved in 
opposite-sex encounters compared to those who engaged in same-sex activity (F(1, 
62)=6.65 P=0.012). Specifically, negative attributions were higher against females who 
engaged in an act of oral sex with an under-age male than those who engaged in oral sex 
with another female, but the differences were not statistically significant (F(1, 62)=2.77 
P=0.101). In contrast, negative attributions ran much higher against those who engaged 
in oral sex with another males than those who engaged in oral sex with an opposite-sex 
partner (F(1, 62)=3.62 P=0.003). 
Table 6. Decision to Prosecute & Presence of Romeo & Juliet Statute 
 
Decision to Prosecute & Presence of Romeo & Juliet Statute 
 No, I would not 
choose to prosecute 
this case 
Yes, I would 
choose to prosecute 
this case 
Total 
Romeo and Juliet 
Statute Present  
32 
56.1% 
7 
53.84% 
39 
55.71% 
No, Romeo & 
Juliet Statute Not 
Present 
25 
43.85% 
6 
46.15% 
31 
44.28% 
Total 57 
81.42% 
13  
18.57% 
70 
Number Observed: 60 Valid Percent: 85.7%, Chi2=1.013 
 
Of the 13 prosecutors (18.5%) who indicated they would prosecute this case, six 
stated that their state had a Romeo and Juliet law. Over half—specifically 53.84%—of 
those that would chose not to prosecute cited that their state had, to their knowledge, no 
statute like it.  In contrast, 57 (81.4%) of the respondents indicated they would not 
prosecute the case.  Of those just over half (n=32, 56.1%) reported that they had Romeo 
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and Juliet statutes in their states, while the remaining 25 (43.9%) did not.  Put differently, 
the data suggests that the existence of a Romeo and Juliet statute had no mitigating effect 
on likelihood to prosecute. 
Figure 2. Duration on Sex Offender Registry Period: 
 
 
Offender Gender Main Effect: F(1, 62) = 1.52, p = .222, ηp2 = .02 
Offender Sexual Orientation Main Effect: F(1, 62) = 7.15, p = .010, ηp2 = .10 
Offender Gender x Sexual Orientation Interaction: F(1, 62) = 4.81, p = .032, ηp2= .07 
  
In a univariate analysis of variance between registration outcome of “offender”” 
and “victim” sex, I found that the main effect of the situation’s implied sexual orientation 
is not significant (F(1, 62)=1.62, p=0.210), but the main effect of sex is significant, such 
that our sample13 was more punitive toward female offenders (m=0.54, SD=0.88) than 
male offenders (m=0.12; SD= 0.45; F(1, 62)=9.30, p=0.003). The main effects are qualified 
by a significant interaction effect (F(1,62)=6.58, p=0.013) such that our sample prosecutors 																																																								13	This	graph	contains	punishment	duration	recommendations	for	our	entire	sample.	Those	who	chose	not	prosecute	responded	with	a	punishment	duration	of	zero.		
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are more likely to seek sex offender registration for males who offend with same-sex 
partners than their male counterparts who offend with opposite-sex partners (F(1,62)=6.58, 
p=0.013). The effect of implied sexual orientation within female offenders, however, 
reveals the inverse insofar as prosecutors are more like to seek sex offender registration 
for opposite-sex female offenders than same-sex female offenders, however this effect 
was not significant (F(1, 62) = 4.81, p = .032, ηp2= .07). From the graph above, we see 
that same-sex male offenders receive a punishment nearly six times longer than opposite-
sex male offenders—this effect is not as disparate when it comes to same-sex and 
opposite-sex female offenders. 
Table 7. Correlation of Decision to Prosecute, Appropriate Outcome, and likelihood 
of Recidivating Measures  
Correlation of Decision to Prosecute, Appropriate Outcome, and likelihood of 
Recidivating Measures 
 Decision to 
Prosecute 
Appropriate 
Outcome  
Likelihood of 
Recidivating  
Decision to 
Prosecute 
1.00 -- -- 
Appropriate 
Outcome 
0.6965 1.00 -- 
Likelihood of 
Recidivating 
0.3280 0.3194 1.00 
 
A correlation between likelihood to prosecute, appropriate outcome for offender, 
and the probability that the offender will commit another sex offense reveals marginally 
significant results between likelihood to prosecute and the prosecutors’ belief that the 
offender will commit another sex offense (r= 0.529 p=0.47). The correlation between 
appropriate outcome for the offender and the prosecutor’s belief that that the offender 
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will commit another sex offense also showed marginally significant results (r= 0.258 
p=0.059). 
Correlations between demographic variables—such as political orientation, 
participant age, participant, participant sex, the number of years participant has been an 
attorney, the likelihood to prosecute, and their preferred punishment outcome—showed 
statistically insignificant results at an alpha of 0.05. The likelihood that prosecutor’s 
likelihood to prosecute are unrelated to demographic variables (all r’s < .15, p> 0.257). 
The prosecutors’ decisions regarding the appropriate disposition for offenders were also 
unrelated to the demographic factors of prosecutors (all r’s < 0.13, p>0.30).  
The correlation between our attribution scale and likelihood to prosecute and 
appropriate outcome variables were also tested. Likelihood to prosecute and attributions 
scale were significantly correlated (r=0.421, p=0.001). The correlation between the 
appropriate outcome for the offender and our attributions scale also showed a relationship 
between these two variables (r=0.331, p=0.007). This means that the higher the level of 
negative attributions, or attitudes, that prosecutors hold about the offender, the higher the 
likelihood that the case would get prosecuted.  
Qualitative Patterns 	
The overwhelming reason prosecutors offered in support of their decision not to 
prosecute (n=13) the case was that the act was consensual, and therefore, did not 
constitute prosecution as exemplified by “We try and limit prosecution to cases where 
there is coercion, force, or some type of fear in balance and that the courts offer little to 
"consensual offenders" (n=16). Another reason for not prosecuting was that the offender 
and victim were “too close in age” and therefore not a sexually exploitive situation 
	 42	
(n=17).  Other reasons provided for not prosecuting included: (1) that they would pursue 
a rehabilitative route (n=4); and (2) that the criminal punishment that could result from 
prosecuting this case does not fit the crime described (n=4).  
A few of the prosecutors who indicated they would not prosecute expressed some 
reservations about their decisions: 
Respondent #26: 
“I would not prosecute this case unless I was put under extreme pressure by 
the parents of the boy" 
Respondent #9: 
“I would prosecute if the offender had a prior history of inappropriate sexual 
behavior 
Respondent #65: 
“Use of alcohol and/or drugs-could change my view.”   
Others who chose not to prosecute stated that their state’s laws restricted them 
from prosecuting (n=43) and stated that “there is no case,” that this is “not a criminal 
issue,” or that “The minor is not a true "sex offender" who needs intervention via the 
Juvenile Justice System. She is unlikely to re-offend.”  Moreover, several prosecutors in 
the sample who decided to not prosecute did so with the moral reasoning that “it didn’t 
seem like the right thing to do” (n=12). 
Although our sample did not have a high percentage of individuals who chose to 
prosecute—only 13 people (about 18%)—the explanations they offered revealed some 
interesting patterns.  The most frequent response concerned a strict constructionist view 
of statutory rape law as illustrated in on prosecutor’s response that “according to the letter 
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of the law this behavior is illegal, and it's my job to enforce the law regardless of my 
personal feelings” (n=6). In other words, because the law provides that people under a 
certain age cannot provide effective legal consent to engage in oral sex, the fact that such 
sexual activity occurred constituted a de facto violation of law that prosecutors had a duty 
to pursue regardless of their personal feelings or opinions. 
 In regards to the Romeo & Juliet exemptions, some prosecutors who elected to 
prosecute cited that their laws, while there was a Romeo & Juliet protection in place, this 
exemption didn’t protect for oral sex or that “ this scenario is not what, in my opinion, the 
statute was intended to prevent” (n=4).   One prosecutor, who chose not to prosecute, 
noted that “this case is troubling” since Romeo & Juliet protections across states do not 
all include an oral sex component and another prosecutor who also chose not to prosecute 
stated that “the spirit of the exemption would apply.” 
Others explained that they would prosecute, but they would do so for reasons of 
legal paternalism, seeking rehabilitative or therapeutic sanctions lieu of criminal 
punishment (n=4): 
Respondent #1: 
Because the suspect is a juvenile, the options from pursuing this case are 
great. We could just have him attend a class and do an "informal adjustment" 
so he would have no "conviction" or "adjudication" and would not be required 
to register. The consequences are minimal. 
Respondent #5: 
	 44	
I don’t like the phrase "winning the case, do you mean getting a plea and 
going to jury trial? Winning does not matter with juvenile cases, rehabilitation 
is what matters. 
Respondent #43: 
“The minor is not a true "sex offender" who needs intervention via the 
Juvenile Justice System. She is unlikely to re-offend. If the boy's parents were 
insistent on pursuing the case I would refer the girl for a diversion program.” 
Respondent #51: 
“Would prosecute in juvenile court where the goals of the system are much 
different than in superior court. Services clearly need to be provided to 
prevent future delinquent behavior or possibly STD, unplanned pregnancies, 
etc.” 
Analysis revealed several trends within both the “would prosecute” and the 
“would not prosecute” groups. One concerned expressions that their decisions were 
conditional on the outcome of a “psychological evaluation” (n=5) or whether the 
defendant had a “prior history of delinquency” either of which would indicate either 
predatory intent or a likelihood of further offenses (n=23). 
Respondent #22: 
“Prior criminal history especially anything violent or sexual in nature. This 
would give me a better understanding of the defendant and the likelihood of 
recidivism.” 
Respondent #42: 
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“1) Does Jen have a history of sexually inappropriate behavior toward this boy 
and/or others? If so, this pattern of conduct may indicate the need for 
psychological assessment and appropriate services either through a diversion 
program or prosecution. 2) Is the victim functioning, intellectually and 
emotionally, at his chronological age? If the boy is significantly delayed, the 
delay would affect his ability to give ‘consent’ 
Another trend was whether the person over the age of consent actually knew that 
the minor had been under the age of consent or, alternatively, if the two parties were or 
had been in a relationship (n=9). 
Respondent #33: 
“I would want to know if the two had any relationship prior” 
Respondent #9: 
“Did he know she was underage?” 
 There were also requests for information regarding the victim’s and defendant’s 
credibility such as “court willingness/court opinion” of those on trial and “grades” of the 
victim or defendant (n=12): 
Respondent #51: 
“Courts willingness to entertain a charge of reduction even though facts 
clearly fit a felony offense.” 
Respondent #44: 
“Grades and behavioral reports from school.” 
  
	 46	
Discussion 	
The focus of this study was to determine whether inconsistencies in prosecution 
decisions and sentencing recommendations akin to those seen in Kansas v. Limon might 
be attributed to extra-legal biases relating to sexual orientation and sex. Although cases in 
which a minor and an adult of similar ages engage in a same-sex sexual act constitute 
only a small percentage of sexual assault cases in total, the effects of prosecution and 
punishment can affect the juvenile well into adulthood. These results should inform 
prosecutors to be more cognizant of their bias(es) in legally ambiguous cases, in order to 
avoid discrimination against this population. Furthermore, the findings should also 
inspire action in policy to afford more codified protections so that the potential risks 
faced by these juveniles are further minimized. In addition, more research on how sexual 
orientation influences processes in the criminal justice system is needed to further 
illuminate the issue of how “offender” sex and “victim” sex combinations affect the 
prosecutorial decision making process.  
Because there was no statistically significant effect from our data manipulations 
of “offender” sex and “victim” sex, hypothesis 1 regarding prosecutors’ likelihood to 
prosecute same-sex offenders more than opposite-sex offenders, hypothesis 2 regarding 
prosecutors’ likelihood to prosecute males more than females, and hypothesis 3 regarding 
prosecutors’ likelihood to prosecute same-sex male offenders more than any other sex 
manipulation must be rejected. I believe that we failed to see an effect from our 
manipulations for numerous reasons: 1) prosecutor judgment of the offender is not 
affected by our “offender” sex and “victim” sex manipulations and combinations but does 
not manifest itself in the decision to prosecute—their personal beliefs and opinions are 
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kept separate from the prosecutorial process; 2) prosecutors understood the purpose of 
our study and altered their decisions in order to not appear biased but could not veil these 
opinions when asked about their perception of the offender; or 3) there were more 
mitigating circumstances in this case to cancel out any aggravating effect from “offender” 
sex and “victim” sex. In reference to hypotheses 4 (regarding prosecutors being more 
likely to punish same sex offenders more severely than opposite-sex offenders) and 
hypothesis 5 (regarding prosecutors being more likely to punish males more harshly than 
females), data analyses determined that the sample of prosecutors were not excessively 
punitive; indeed, the overwhelming majority would not prosecute the case, so these 
hypotheses must be rejected as well. For respondents who would prosecute, they 
indicated that they would do so in accordance with sex offender punishments for adult 
offenders as required through state law. Hypothesis 6 (prosecutors will be more likely to 
severely punish same-sex male offenders than any other sex manipulation combination) 
may be accepted since our analyses indicated a statistically significant effect. 
Specifically, the results indicate that prosecutors would place  males who offended with 
another male on the sex offender register almost six times as long as males who engaged 
in oral sex with opposite-sex partners and about three times as long as females who 
offended with either same- or opposite-sex partners.  
In regards to the final research question regarding whether state law provided 
justification for prosecutorial discretion, it is unclear to what extent the law on deciding 
to prosecute according to our quantitative and qualitative results. Regression results 
reveal that the presence of a Romeo & Juliet Statute did not have a statistically significant 
effect on deciding whether or not prosecute (z=-1.14 p=0.41), The majority of 
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prosecutors who came from a state with a Romeo and Juliet provision in state law rarely 
included this exemption as an explanation for not prosecuting. Instead, mitigating 
circumstances—such as closeness in age and acts that were not coerced or forced— were 
predominant over any other reasons (e.g. the presented scenario is criminal). There could 
be many causes behind this; however, our research supports that most Romeo and Juliet 
provisions do not always codify for oral sex situations versus sexual intercourse 
involving penetration. Because oral sex was not always included in a Romeo and Juliet 
provision in state law, cases in which a minor and an adult of roughly similar age engage 
in oral sex provides an ambiguous circumstance that invites the exercise of high levels of 
prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor may have determined that the exemption did not 
apply because the wording of the statute may not have encompassed acts of oral sex or, 
alternatively, may not have applied to sexual activity between members of the same-sex. 
In addition, states in which there were no Romeo and Juliet type exemptions and the 
prosecutor chose not to prosecute, indicated the presence of prosecutor nullification in 
which the prosecutor likely viewed either the law itself or the associated punishment as 
unjust and, therefore, chose not to enforce it (n=35).  
To sum up, I found that there is a negative effect for same-sex male offenders in 
terms of punishment duration and prosecutor attitudes towards these offenders. 
Respondents indicated similarly negative views against females who offended with 
members of opposite-sex.  Importantly, however, unlike with male defendants who 
engaged in oral sex with a same-sex partner, the negative view of female defendants in 
the opposite-sex vignette did not translate into harsh sentencing decisions in terms of 
recommending longer time periods of the sex offender registry. These findings could be 
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attributed to our study being limited in response rate, sample size, and power, thus 
making it likely that a Type II error was committed, or it could be because of the 
ambiguity of the survey questions. When a prosecutor makes the decision to prosecute, 
law and depth of evidence bind them more than when they decide whether or not to 
prosecute, so their personal prejudice or impartiality cannot affect his decision. In other 
aspects of the decision-making process—such as when they recommend punishment type 
and duration— prosecutors can be much more influenced by extra-legal factors because 
their discretion is virtually unrestricted.   
Modern prejudice theories posit that social suppression of these undesirable views 
are kept in check when bias is most apparent, but in situations where there are certain 
justifications or excuses in which bias can be expressed without being noticed, bias is 
expressed (Crandall, Eschelman, O’Brien, 2002). This could be an alternate explanation 
to how prosecutors tended to punish same-sex versus opposite-sex sexual interactions 
within both male and female sexes. However, when comparing same-sex interactions, 
males are punished (at least) twice as severely than females. This finding indicates a clear 
bias and sex effect within same-sex interactions.  
Our results showed that attributions concerning female offenders were more 
negative when the offender had engaged in a heterosexual sex act than when a female 
offender engaged in oral sex with another female, however, this effect found within the 
female condition revealed to be not statistically significant.  The opposite was true for 
male offenders. This could be because same-sex female offenders are perceived as “going 
through a phase” while opposite-sex female offenders’ sexual orientation is “set”; 
therefore, the latter group may seem more predatory and more likely to offend because 
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they are seen as fixed in their sexual orientation as speculated by Salerno, Bottoms, 
Murphy in their 2014 study. The same-sex female offender could be considered more 
normative in this scenario since the individuals are young and it is interpreted as sexual 
exploration (Salerno, Bottoms, Murphy, 2014). On the other hand, presumed gay male 
offenders were judged more negatively than their presumed straight male counterparts. A 
possible explanation for this could be that, unlike females who engage in same-sex 
activity who may be viewed as going through a phase, males who engage in same-sex 
activity are likely to be viewed as being gay—a more permanent sexual orientation than 
the fluidity ascribed to female sexuality (see Kanazawa, 2016). This could, again, be 
attributed to normative values and gender expectations associated with sexuality 
throughout adolescence (Herek, 2002; see also Salerno, Bottoms, Murphy, 2014).   
The effect that personal attributions can have in prosecutorial discretion can prove 
problematic as evidenced by some of the qualitative patterns observed in the participants’ 
short response answers. Several participants wrote that they would prosecute if the family 
or parents insisted (n=5).  Parents can be alarmed when they discover their teenager is 
engaging in sexual activity, and this alarm can be exacerbated if the sexual activity 
involves same-sex relations (Bullough & Bullough, 1977; Herek & Capitanio, 1999). 
This is problematic because the intent of Romeo and Juliet provisions (and similar age-
gap exemptions) are to protect against parents from pressing charges because they are 
unhappy with the sexual relationship their teenager is engaging in, similar to how the 
parents of Romeo and Juliet disapproved of their relationship (James, 2009). More severe 
punishment trends may be seen in male offenders because of the penetrative component 
in their same-sex sexual activities.  
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Penetration may elicit more negative attributions towards the offender because it 
could be interpreted as more forceful or aggressive. When the offender and victim are 
both female, the sexual act may be seen as less severe because of a lack of penetration, 
which may elicit less negative attributes. Also, girls are traditionally seen as gatekeepers 
in sexual activities, so having a female initiating the sexual act may be considered as a 
less coerced sexual situation. This can also explain why female offenders in these cases 
are not punished as severely as male offenders, however, this does not explain why male 
same-sex offenders being punished much longer than male opposite-sex offenders. This 
could be explained through moral outrage and disgust emotions that could be amplified 
due to the non-sexually normative act of homosexual intercourse. Since homosexuality 
has been socially and legally condemned throughout history, anti-gay sentiments could be 
the cause of this effect. However, this effect did not translate over within the female 
condition. A possible explanation could be that female homosexual acts are considered to 
more experimental, inferring a less set path towards homosexuality, and overall revered 
in popular culture and media as “sexy.” Even though these attitudes are kept separate 
from the actual decision of whether or not to prosecute, our research found that it does 
impact of punishment duration.   
Policy Implications 	
Currently 31 states in the United States are recognized as having Romeo and 
Juliet provisions while 45 states have some form of an age gap provision to protect 
juveniles from harsh criminal punishments for engaging in age-normative sexual activity 
(James, 2009; National Juvenile Defender Center, 2015). The exact number of states with 
protections of this sort is hard to pinpoint because these laws are vastly different from 
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state to state and are sometimes written ambiguously. Some states have a single age of 
consent, below which an individual cannot legally provide consent—typically 18 
however some states have it set at a younger age—and those above that age can legally 
provide consent. Other states include age-gap provisions, which allow for sexual activity 
between a minor and an adult if they are a close in age. These age gap provisions may 
protect juveniles by reducing adult punishment, reducing punishment as a juvenile, or 
completely protect by declassifying it as a crime. Furthermore, states may have sodomy 
laws, thus effectively nullifying consent at any age within the act of sodomy. According 
to the legal encyclopedia American Jurisprudence, 
A sodomy statute may incorporate the general statutory definition of ‘adult,’ 
meaning that the crime is committed on a person under the age of 18, even 
though 15-year-olds may consent to sexual intercourse, as that ability does not 
equate with being an ‘adult,’ and sex acts with children are excepted from due 
process protection. Sodomy laws may also apply only to acts involving 
minors, as the government has an interest in preventing sexual conduct 
between minors and in promoting their health by reducing the risk of sexually 
transmitted diseases (70C AM. JUR. 2d, Sodomy § 37, 2011). 
These laws are difficult to interpret and fail to extend protection across all sexes, 
genders, sexual orientations, and sexual activities. As far as policy goes, this study could 
influence three major changes. First, an increase in adoption of Romeo and Juliet 
provisions nationwide would protect against the influence of extra-legal factors in these 
types of cases. Second, re-writing laws to include oral sex (and anal sex) would be more 
inclusive of LGBTQIA people, thereby promoting equality under law. Third, not only 
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should the protections include for all types of sexual acts, these exemptions should be 
worded in a way that in gender/sex-neutral and sexual-orientation neutral in order to 
prevent further instances like the Matthew Limon case.  
Beyond Romeo and Juliet age-gap exemptions, we should look towards making 
law in general more gender, sex, and sexual orientation neutral. This would include 
extending this concept to policies such as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
which currently does not extend protections to include homosexual or trans-gender 
populations (Weinberg, 2009). Lastly, since prosecutors must constantly continue their 
education and furthering their understanding of issues within the criminal justice system, 
implementing bias training that highlights subconscious bias manifestation and research 
findings that exemplify bias within legal decisions so prejudice based decisions are 
reduced. 
Limitations 	
Our most prominent limitations in this study are the small sample size and the low 
return rate for surveys mailed to prosecutors. This limitation is partially mitigated by 
having received a sufficient number of survey responses to fill each of the four 
manipulations needed to conduct data analyses.  Indeed, I cannot be confident in our 
statistically non-significant findings since the small sample size may mask significant 
differences, due to the low statistical power associated with the low number of 
participants represented in each cell condition of the study.  Our results need to be 
replicated not only with a larger number of participants, but also with a more even 
distribution of participants across each condition in the study.  Only a larger, more 
representative sample would allow generalizations to be made concerning prosecutors 
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nationwide.  Still, this study provides a good first-step by showing the potential issues 
that can occur when researching this topic. 
The measures that were taken to increase the survey response rate (such as 
shortening the survey from the one used in pilot study) helped to secure more data for 
analysis, but also limited the depth and variety of data I could collect. In the pilot study, 
the survey asked a longer battery of questions with numerous retests worded differently 
in order to ensure the reliability of the measures. Limiting the paper survey to a single 
page (and back) increase the response rate, but reduced the complexity of the survey, 
thereby deceased the data available for analysis.  
Another limitation of our research design concerns variations in the proportion of 
prosecutors surveyed from each state. Because there is so much variability in the 
populations and sizes of each state, it would make sense that some states would have a 
highly disproportionate number of prosecutors in comparison to other states. 
Furthermore, since our method of obtaining mailing addresses relied upon Internet 
searches, it excluded district attorney offices not properly listed online, thus our surveyed 
sample did not reach every prosecutor in the nation. Both of these complications threaten 
validity because more surveys were sent out to certain states than others (i.e. Hawaii n=4, 
Missouri (n=111).  
While I found no determinant effect on prosecutorial discretion or punishment 
within demographic data, it is important to note that the sample consisted of mostly 
conservative, White males.  Concerns about the lack of generalizability from such a 
sample, however, should be mitigated by the fact that this profile aligns with those of 
most prosecutors in the United States (see Women Donors Network, 2015).  
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Future Research 	
Future research should focus on obtaining a better response rate and larger 
sample, in order to have more reliable result and avoid making Type II errors. Before 
doing this, more research is needed on this population in order to better understand how 
to better reach participants in order to obtain a large enough sample. General response-
boosting techniques only go so far with special populations— such as prosecutors— so 
relying on other prosecutor-related studies that formulated more effective sampling 
models is a adequate place to start. Those interested in replicating this study should 
consider contacting membership agencies frequented by prosecutors such as the 
American Bar Association or contacting law review journals to obtain a bigger sample 
for study. While this approach may not necessarily improve response rates, it could prove 
fruitful in providing a study with more power to pick out effects and interactions.  
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APPENDIX  
A SURVEY INSTRUMENT 	
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Adults found guilty of a sex offense must be listed on a public sex offender registry. 
In various states, this registry includes information such as name, social security 
number, age, race, gender, birth date, physical description, address, place of 
employment, details about the offense(s), fingerprints, a photo, a blood sample, and a 
hair sample. This information is available to the public upon request, sometimes by 
being posted on the Internet. In some cases, the police directly notify the people who 
live in the same area as the registered sex offender. Sex offenders are required to 
register anywhere from a few years to their entire life, depending on the state.  
We are interested in your thoughts about applying these registration laws to 
juveniles who have been adjudicated (found guilty in juvenile court) or convicted 
as sex offenders.  
 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions below with this case in 
mind. 
David, a high school junior, attended a party at a friend's house. During the party, a 
freshman boy performed oral sex on David. The boy’s parents found out about the 
incident and decided that they wanted to press criminal charges. Although both teenagers 
stated that the act was consensual, because the boy was underage, he could not legally 
provide consent. This incident occurred in a state that has a "Romeo and Juliet" 
exemption for contact between minors who are similar in age that would lead to a 
misdemeanor charge in this case if the act had been sexual intercourse, but the exemption 
does not mention oral sex. 
 
1. I would choose to prosecute this case (please circle one): YES  NO 
2.       If YES: What would you charge David with? 
_____________________________________________________ 
3. What is the likelihood that you would prosecute this case (Please circle one)? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
4. If you DID prosecute this case, what do think is the likelihood of winning the case 
(Please circle one)? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
5. Please provide the reasons why you would or would not prosecute this case:  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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6. What additional information about this case would be important in deciding 
whether to prosecute? Why is it important?: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
7. If he were convicted, in your opinion, what is the most appropriate outcome for 
David? CHECK ONE 
___David should not be required to register at all with law enforcement in this 
community 
___David should be required to register, but his information should never be posted on 
the Internet 
___David should be required to register, but his information should not be publicly 
posted on the Internet until he turns 18, at which time his information should be 
publicly posted on the Internet 
___David should be required to register and his information should be publicly posted on 
the Internet immediately 
8.   How confident are you about this choice?  
0% (not confident at all)  10%  20%   30%  40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
 100% (completely confident) 
 
9. How long should David be required to register as a sex offender? 
___________________________________ 
10. In your opinion, what is the probability that David will eventually commit 
another sex offense? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
% 
 
11.   Given the case facts you just read, please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following items. Use the following scale:  
 Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
a) I feel a compelling need to 
punish David 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
b) I believe David is evil 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c) I feel morally outraged by 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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what David did to his 
alleged victim 
d) David’s actions should be 
considered a sex offense 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
e) David’s actions legally 
constitute aggravated child 
molestation 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
f) David poses a danger to 
society 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
g) David is a bad person 1 2 3 4 5 6 
h) David  is a perverted person 1 2 3 4 5 6 
i) David is a sexually 
promiscuous person 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
j) Should the Romeo and Juliet 
exception’s silence be 
construed as including oral 
sex? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
k) Using your prosecutorial 
discretion, would you 
prosecute David to the full 
extent of the law? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
12. Your gender:  Male     Female       13. Age: ______   
14. What 
ethnicity 
are you?  
White Black Hispanic Asian Other:___________________________ 
15. When it comes to politics, how liberal or conservative are you? CIRCLE 
Extremely 
Liberal 
Liberal Slightly 
Liberal 
Moderate Slightly 
Conserva
tive 
Conservat
ive 
Extremely 
Conservat
ive 
16. What is your job title? 
_________________________________________________________ 
17. Do you specialize in a particular type of law or 
case?_____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
______________________ 
18. How many years have you been a prosecutor? 
___________________________________________________ 
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19. What is the age at which your state grants legal permission for someone to 
consent to sexual activity with another person who is over the age of consent? 
20. Does your state have a so-called “Romeo and Juliet” exception to the usual age 
of consent rules that exempt teenagers within a certain number of years of each 
other’s ages from statutory rape (or similar) liability?  ___ Yes  ____ No    
21. If yes, please provide the statutory citation: _________________. 
